The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces has released their mark for H.R. 2500, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA).
The subcommittee will meet today at 3:30 PM ET to discuss their bill, with the proceedings being live streamed here.
Of note to ECA members, below are excerpts from the bill summary and directive report language related to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB).
Further details about authorized funding for the various agencies will be released during the full committee markup of the FY 2020 NDAA on June 12.
You can find a copy of the current mark here. A subcommittee press release is available here.
Summary of Bill Language
DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS
TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM AUTHORIZATIONS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
Section 31XX—Personnel Levels of the Office of the Administrator for Nuclear Security
This section would raise the number of full-time equivalent positions the Administrator for Nuclear Security would be able to hire before notifying Congress, and amend reporting requirements related to support service contracts.
Section 31XX—Elimination of Limitation on Availability of Funds Relating to Submission of Annual Report on Unfunded Priorities
This section would repeal the limitation on funds related to submission of the annual report on unfunded priorities.
Section 31XX—Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation
This section would express the sense of Congress on the staffing level of the Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE), mandate that the Director of CEPE report directly to the National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator, and require the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act on the
plan to fully staff CEPE.
Section 31XX—Annual Certification of Shipments to Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
This section would extend the certification of shipments of waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant from a 3-year period to a 10-year period.
Section 31xx—Repeal of Limitation on Availability of Funds for Acceleration of Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement
This section would amend section 3125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) to terminate the prohibition on accelerating nuclear weapons dismantlement and the maximum funds that may be obligated or expended to carry out nuclear weapons dismantlement and disposition activities.
Section 31xx—Modification to Plutonium Pit Production Capacity
This section would repeal the requirement for the Secretary of Energy to demonstrate the capability to produce war reserve plutonium pits at a rate sufficient to produce 80 pits per year by 2027.
TITLE XXXII—DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
Section 32xx—Authorization
This section would authorize $29,450,000 for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Section 32XX—Improvements to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
This section would create a director of operations for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, establish a floor for the number of full-time equivalent employees, and codify the Board's prompt and unfettered access to defense nuclear facilities.
Directive Report Language
DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS
TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Weapons Activities
Report on unobligated enriched uranium and domestic uranium requirements
The committee believes the Department of Energy must ensure the availability of the supply of unobligated enriched uranium for national security purposes, notably for producing tritium and to power naval reactors. In addition, the Department of Energy recently announced plans to support a demonstration program for the enrichment of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in potential future advanced commercial reactors and
micro-reactors for the Department of Defense. The National Nuclear Security Administration shifted the need for domestically-produced low-enriched uranium (LEU) from 2027 to 2041 after additional review. Other options could delay the need to build a uranium enrichment facility: declaring additional excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU); negotiating an agreement with the European nrichment services company Urenco to allow the United States, as it does with France, to use the LEU it produces
for military, but non-explosive purposes; reconsidering the amount of unobligated uranium required to produce tritium; building a new, smaller non-power-generating government reactor dedicated to the production of tritium for national security purposes; and using LEU for naval reactors. Serious consideration of these options would delay the need to build a new U.S. enrichment facility that the Department of Energy has estimated will cost $3.1 to $11.3 billion depending on its
size.
In 2016, the Department of Energy initiated an analysis of alternatives (AOA) to provide a supply of unobligated enriched uranium for the long-term. The committee expects the Department of Energy to comprehensively consider all alternatives, consistent with Department of Energy guidance and the Government Accountability Office's 2018 report on enriched uranium and its 2015 report on best practices for AOA processes, and to
consider costs, including life-cycle costs, need dates, domestic industrial base impacts, and opportunities to change existing policy. The Department of Energy should work closely with the Department of State to engage allies in discussions on potential policy changes.
The committee therefore directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than November 1, 2019, including: information on size, costs and timelines for a new enrichment facility; options to declare additional HEU as excess and down-blend it; what percentage of LEU is used specifically for producing tritium, rather the total amount of LEU needed to fuel the TVA
reactor; options to load the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reactor cores with a mix of unobligated and obligated LEU, a plan to engage URENCO and European allies about the use of obligated LEU, options to reflag LEU used in TVA reactors and any related change in U.S. policy; amount and timelines related to HEU stocks for naval reactors and how much would be available if LEU (not from blend-down of HEU) fuel were available to use in aircraft carrier reactors and potentially in submarine
reactors; the technical and cost considerations for building a government reactor dedicated to national security purposes; and the impact of the commercial HALEU production plans on the ability of the Department of Energy to meet unobligated fuel supply for national security missions, and why those fuels must utilize unobligated enriched uranium.
Reports of sexual assault in the protective force
The committee is concerned about recent reports of sexual harassment and assault within the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) protective force and the NNSA’s response to these serious allegations. The protective force provides, among other things, the physical security for the Nation’s most sensitive nuclear sites and facilities. A culture that is permissive of sexual harassment and assault cannot effectively
perform its responsibilities and would pose serious national security risks. The committee encourages the NNSA to address these incidents must ensure their system for reporting, investigating, and addressing allegations of sexual harassment and assault by Government contractors within the protective force is independently reviewed to assure its effectiveness.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to comprehensively review the issue of sexual harassment and assault within the NNSA protective force. Specifically, the Comptroller General shall assess the impact of sexual harassment on security of the nuclear security enterprise; how NNSA’s security contracts and its oversight and management mechanisms for these contracts integrate sexual harassment
prevention and reporting into the safety culture; how NNSA’s security contracts are awarded, managed, and overseen; how the NNSA’s security oversight model and management mechanisms integrate sexual harassment prevention into its promotion of security culture; and the extent to which NNSA has held those responsible for sexual harassment or assault accountable. The Comptroller General shall provide an interim briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than October 7, 2019, with a
report to follow not later than December 20, 2019.
Risks and sustainment plan for Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory
The Department of Energy’s Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is the Nation’s enduring Plutonium Research and Development and production capability. The facility has been operational since 1978, and is currently undergoing major upgrades to ensure a pit production capability of 30 pits per year by 2026. Given the age and use of the facility, which includes additional plutonium activities, the committee
is concerned about the continued viability of the site in the long-term.
To better understand the risks to PF-4 and plans to continue its mission, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than December 31, 2019, assessing the risks to the continued viability of PF-4 through 2045 and plans for either sustaining the facility or replacing it, including timelines and estimated costs.
Stockpile Stewardship 2.0
The Department of Energy’s science-based stockpile stewardship program has allowed the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to certify to the President for the 22nd consecutive year that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the use of nuclear explosive testing. This impressive scientific achievement is enabled by National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) most valuable
resource, its workforce. NNSA’s ability to recruit, train, and retain the next generation of world-class scientists, engineers, and technicians is a major priority.
To ensure the NNSA’s workforce achieved its stockpile stewardship goals over the past two decades, the NNSA constructed numerous world-class scientific facilities at its laboratories and production sites. These facilities have yielded important scientific insight of benefit to the nuclear enterprise, as well as the broader scientific community. As the NNSA continues to recruit, train, and retain the next generation of world-class
scientists, engineers and technicians, it must also remain on the cutting-edge of science and look to future scientific challenges facing the nuclear stockpile.
To better understand how the National Nuclear Security Administration will approach the next set of long-term science questions related to the nuclear stockpile, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a detailed report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 13, 2020, assessing the major science questions facing the stockpile stewardship program over the next 20 years, and a
plan to address them. The committee requests that the Department of Energy conduct this activity in consultation with the national laboratories and other partners as appropriate.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Nuclear Verification Plan
The committee notes that once the United States withdraws, absent Russia returning to compliance, from the Intermediate-Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), only Russia's strategic forces accountable under the New START Treaty will be subject to constraints, inspection, and verification. The committee also notes that the United States, per the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, is "prepared to consider arms control opportunities that return
parties to compliance, predictability, and transparency, and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States, its allies, and partners." As such, the committee notes that the United States must be prepared to address Russia's significantly larger non-strategic nuclear arsenal through arms control, should Russia accept such limits through a nuclear arms control negotiation.
Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 13, 2020, with a detailed plan for ensuring the United States is prepared, from a technology perspective, to inspect and verify non-strategic nuclear warheads as part of a future arms control agreement. The report should detail domestic and international efforts that the
Department is undertaking. The report should also assess the costs and timeline required to ensure full U.S. preparedness in the event the United States and Russia were to agree to limits on nonstrategic nuclear forces. The committee directs the report to be provided in unclassified form, with a classified annex as necessary.
Excess Plutonium Disposition
The committee notes the United States' commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium as part of the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Agreement, signed in 2000, with Russia. The committee also notes that in October 2018, the Secretary of Energy delivered official notice of contract termination of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) due to significant costs, delays and difficulties executing this
program. The committee also emphasizes that the Secretary proposed to dispose of this material through the Dilute and Dispose program which was more affordable and required a fraction of the funding MOX would have required. The MFFF would have disposed of the 34 metric tons by creating mixed-oxide fuel for use in commercial power reactions. The committee notes the commitment to dispose of the 34 metric tons of excess plutonium and is concerned that funding has not been prioritized to implement
this program due to prioritizing plutonium pit production at the Savannah River Site, leading to questions about the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation commitment to disposal of this excess material.
Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than February 28, 2020, with a detailed plan, including timelines, plans to engage the State of New Mexico and Russia on any necessary negotiations to pursue the Dilute and Dispose approach, funding requirements, including funding requirements over the next 5 years, to begin disposing of this
excess plutonium.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Defense Environmental Cleanup
Savannah River Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative
The committee notes that the fiscal year 2020 budget request included a request for the Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative to support design and construction of a modern research and development facility accessible by commercial industry and academia. The committee further notes the goal of the facility would be to develop safer, faster, and more cost effective nuclear chemical manufacturing and cleanup technologies and
expertise to tackle the remaining challenges in the cleanup of radioactive and chemical waste from Cold War activities, nuclear research, and non-proliferation missions.
Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 13, 2020, with a detailed plan of the construction and operations process for the Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative, including an option for the site's location being outside of the site to encourage local community engagement.
